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Chapter VIII 
Trade Policies and Colombian D3velopment 
The reader who has followed this book so far could expect this 
last chapter to proyide a quantification of the impact of changes in 
Col~ubian tr~de policies on that economy's various development targets in 
the areas of efficiency, growth, employment, income distribution and 
The direction of expected changes in the various magnitudesdependence. 
should not be enou6h; ideally something should also be said about the like­
ly magnitude of the different effects. 
No Guch scientific and credible quantification will be presented 
As forhere. Two interrelated types of difficulties ot:r.nd in the way. 
most countries, no simple positive trade theory appears to explain accurate­
ly the evolving Colombian trade structure. 11n inelegant and qualitative 
eclectic appeal to elements of positive theories of location, "vent-for­
surplus,11 Heckscher-Ohlin, and the product cycle is the best one can do 
to explain Colc:nbLm trnde :>atterns both with industrialized countries, and 
with other d::vcloping countries, particularly those in Latin P.merica. While 
these positive theories of trade q~rce on the nisty proposition that libcr.­
aliz,Jd trndu policies coald and are likely to inprove the efficiency (and 
pe:i;-haps gruwth) of a country without r.ionopoly power in international markets, 
their predictions regarding income distribution and employment effects of 
trade liberalization are even mistier, especially when one leaves the world 
of two f,OOds and two factors. 
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A fairly disaggregated quantitative moc!<?l of the Colo.:ibian 
economy, something which as yet does not exist, could sil'!llllate responses 
to trade policy changes. In this chapter, the kind of information one 
,-10uld ideally want will be listed, and available data will be reviewed. 
Rough orders-of-magnitude estimates will be made whenever possible about 
possible effects of trade policies. 
As it should be clear from earlier chapters, Colombia has been 
going through a period of trade liberalization since 1967. Thus, before 
asking about possible effects of further liberalization, a review of 
major economic trends during 1967 through 1973 will be presented. Then 
we shall speculate on possible effects of further liberalization on 
efficiency, growth, income distribution, employment and dependence. 
The Record for 1967-1973 
Foreign trade statistics, other partial data and national accounts, 
the latter available only through 1972, show a notable change for the better 
between 19-56-67, and 1967-1973. But as can be seen in Table I-1, a good 
share in that contrast can be explained by the difference in behavior of 
the key exogenous variable, the dollar coffee price, which after falling 
nt more than 3 percE'nt per year during 1956 through 1967, rose by more 
1 
than 6 percent per annum from 1967 through 1972. 
Nevertheless, a comparison of trade data for 1948-56 with those 
for 1967-72 confirms what is known from previous chapters: the improved 
performance of recent years is not simply due to exogenous factors. The 
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rise in coffee prices during 1967-72 has been smaller than during 1948-56, 
while the expansion of registered minor exports has been larger. While 
in the earlier years the share of minor exports tended to fall, it has 
continued to rise significantly during 1967-72. Furthermore, contrary 
to what one expects for magnitudes which start from a small base, the 
growth rate of minor exports ror;e between 1956-67 and 1967-72. Undoubtedly, 
many non-traditional exports benefitted from unusually high world prices, 
particularly during 1972-73; but in most cases such exports had originally 
responded to inducements originating in d~~estic policy, which stimulated 
a sector which could so benefit. 
The growth rate of real GDP has averaged more than 6 percent during 
1967 throui:;h 1973, a figure somewhat hir,her than that for 1948 through 
1956, 2 and sharply better, especially when viewed in per capita terms, than 
the averaee 4.6 percent registered for 1956 through 1967. All major GDP 
components listed in Table I-2 shoH increases in their growth rate between 
1956-67 au<l 1967-72, and all stand above their respective averages for the 
whole 1950 throu?,h 1972 period. At least for the level of aggregation 
shown, it does not appear that the higher post-1967 grc,wth is due to pull-
ing resources ~ of least productive (measured) activities and putting 
them into nore produ-:tive ones; the growth profile thus has a uvent-for-
surplus 11 flavor. 3 It may also be observed that the pos t-196 7 expansion 
has a more balanced profile than that for 1950 throu~h 1956. Note 
especially the lower growth rate for construction and the higher one for 
primary production. 
VIII-4 
One way to investigate whether a significant change in the pattern 
of Colo:r.binn cro\.Jth has occurred since 1967 is to examine how well average 
growth r11tes for the postwar period fit post-1967 experience. This has 
been done for the output of major activities in agriculture, livestock 
and manufacturing, as given in the national accounts, available from 1950 
through 1972. Each of the output indices [y] for those activities has 
been fitted with the following regression: 
As before, t denotes a time trend variable going from 1 (for 1950)1 
through 23 (for 1972). The variable t 2 
takes values of zero for 1950 
through 1966t and values of 18, 19, ••• , 22, 23 for the six years included 
in 1967 through 1972. The b coefficient ,,ill then yield the avera8e growth 
rate for the whole period; the c coefficient will give variations during 
1967-72 from such an average. In what follows, when the c coefficient 
is twice or more its standard error, it will be deemed "significant," 
which of course does not imply it is lar!ier. The positive or negative 
deviations can be due to a variety of causes, inclu<ling policy changes not 
directly related to the trade and payments system (,md changes in the 
coverage of national accounts data!). It could also be argued that lack 
of a significant deviation from trend may result from conflicting in­
fluences canccllins each other out. But not having a complete model of 
the Colombian economy, an obvious first step seems to be ex@nining the cl(:arcst 
departures from trend, speculating later as to their meaning. 
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The results frcm this exercise are presented in Tables VIII-1 and 
VIII-2. As noted earlier, recent years have witnessed a slight pick up in 
the mediocre growth rate for agriculture and livestock. Table VIII-1 shows 
that significantly positive (although not necessarily large) 1967-72 devia­
tions from trend appear in garlic and onions, rice, potatoes, plaintains, 
mandioc, horses (!), and "other," both in agriculture and livestock. In 
the Colombian context this group may be characterized as involving pre­
dominantly non-trac!eable goods. Major export- crops, outside coffee, such 
as cotton, bananas, cocoa, sugarcane and tobacco, as well as bovine cattle 
fail to show significant accelerations in their growth rates during 1967-72. 
But note, particularly for cotton, sugarcane, nnd bovine cattle that trend 
growth rates are impressive ones. On the whole, it would be difficult to 
attribute the pick up in the :igriculture and livestock growth rate after 
1967 to further stimuli arising from the trade policies followed since 
that year. At best it could be argued that those policies helped sustain 
continued divcr;:;ification away from coffee and impressive growth rates in 
several export-oriented activitie.s, which otherwise may have witnessed 
slowdowns in performance, as in the case of some oilseeds which had been 
orier:.ted primarily toward import-substitution. Prelit:1inary data for 1973 
show that output t>,rowth for. the whole of agriculture and livestock has 
remained somewhat above the t,hole postwar trend. But no sharp break in 
trend is apparent. 
The man.ufactu1.:ing patten1, presented in Table VIII-2, is even more 
difficult to charc\ctcrizc sioply. First of all, while Table I-2 showed 
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TABLE VIII-1 
Agricultur·e m.1d Livestock: Average Annual Growth R&tes of Output 
for 1950 throurh 1972, and Gro,~h Rate Deviations 
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Refers only to 1950 or 1967 through 1971. 
* Indicates that the coefficient for the deviation from trend is twice 
or more of its t,tmidrn:d error. Both trend and deviation are expressed 
aa annual percentages. 
Sources £lnd 1:,ethod: Basic data obtained from the Colombian National 
Accounts (B dlR). 
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Table VIII-2 
Hanufacturinf-,: Avera!'e Annual Growth Rates of Output 
for 1950 throur;h 1972 t and Growth !~ate Deviations durinR 1967 through 1972 
(Standard Errors in Parentheses) 
Trend growth rate 
1950 through 1972 
All Manufacturing 6.23 
(0.12) 
--Industrial Manufacturing 7.03 
(0.15) 












8.28Shoes and clothing 
(0.20) 








8.72Rubber products (0.68). 
· 8.33Chemical products 
(0.30) 
9.57Petroleum and coal derivatives 
(0. 48) 
6.32Non-metallic mineral products (0.34) 
20.78Basic metal products 
(2.38) 
14.65Mechanical and metallurgical products (0.43) 
Deviation from 
trend during 





































*Indicates that the coefficient for the deviation from trend is twice or 
more its standard error. Both trend and deviation are expressed as annual 
percentages. 
Sources and nethod: Basic data obtained as in Table VIII-1. 
VIII-9 
an increase in the manufacturing growth rate for 196 7 through 1972, in 
contrast with that for the whole period, Table VIII-2 shows a slowdown 
in the 1967-72 growth rate for ''modern" manufacturing. The sensitivity 
of the results to the use of the depressed 1967 as base year (as well as to 
the relatively slow recovery in 1968) sur,gests that no great weight can be 
attached to the apparent trend change. Furthermore, preliminary data for 
1973 indicate above average manufacturing growth rates. On the whole, it 
is doubtful that when longer time series become available, one will be able 
to establish a sienificant break in the manufacturing growth rate around 1967, 
using the technique of Table VIII-2. 
That table also shows a complete pattern of acceleration and decelera­
tion in. growth rates for "modern" r:1.anufacturing branches. Significant 
declines appear for eight branches, significant increases for three, and 
no significant chru1ges show up in five branches. Among the eight activities 
with declining growth rates, one finds several associated with strong 
import substituting efforts, such as chemicals and basic metals, but also 
branches like tc~ctiles, wood products and furniture, increasingly linked to 
manufactured exports. The three manufacturing activities with significant 
acceleration in their growth rates during 1967-72 are also a mixed bag: 
small scale industry and handicrafts, food processing and tobacco processing. 
The three sell overwhelmingly to the domestic market, but presumably have 
sharply different requirements for unskilled and skilled labor and capital. 
Table VIII-3 provides some indirect information on the latter point; unfortu­
nately, the cate5ories in Tables VIII-2 and VIII-3 are not exactly alike, and 
neither source provides information on recent shares of output exported. 
Ld.U..L.C Y ,__..,_-_, 
Rankins of Colombie.--i K..,nufacturing Activities According 
to Value Add~d per i2!?lcied Person_ in 1967 
(Shares in Percentages) 
Value Added Share of Column Share of Share of 
Per Person Share of Total (b) Minus Imports in Exports in 
(Thousand Total Value Employ- Column D~estic Domestic 
1967 Pesos) Added ment Cc) Market Production 
1. Petroleum and coal products 277.7 3.7 0.7 3.0 8.4 14.9
2. Tobacco products 185.0 4.0 1.2 2.8 0.2 
3. Beverages 135.9 13.5 5.4 8.1 0.7 
nil 
nil
4. Chemicals other than pharmaceuticals 87 .. 3 5.6 3.5 2.1 36.5 2.2
5. Phanaaceuticals and related products 87.2 7.1 4.8 2.9 9.3 1.2
6. Basic metal products 68.7 2.1 1.7 0.4 31.5 0.8
7. Paper products 64.4 2.5 2.2 0.3 25.9 11.9
8. Focd precessing 59.8 15.9 14.4 1.5 0.4 nil
9. Rubb,;,:,r products 56.4 2.5 2.4 0.1 4.5 3.3
10. Electrical machinery, except 54.5 2.2 2.2 0 43.6 1;.;2
appliances 
ll. Electrical appliances 49.2 1.0 1.1 -0.l 2.0 nil
12. Other manufacturing 44.2 2.7 3.3 -0.6 19.6 1.3
13. Textiles 43.4 13.0 16.3 -3.3 2.3 2.5
14. Printing and publishing 41.7 ~-1 4.0 -0.9 1.7 1.2
15. Leather and products 41.2 1.1 1.4 -0.3 nil 9.0
16. Non-metallic mineral products 38.1 5.0 7.1 -2.1 3.6 6.0
17. Metal products 36.1 4.4 6.6 -2.2 10.5 1.9
18. Motor vehicles 36.0 1.9 2.9 -1.0 37.0 0.5 
19. Mechanical machinery 32.0 1.2 2.0 -0.8 87.0 13.7
20. Non-electrical appliances 26.6 0.2 0.3 -0.1 nil nil 
21. Wood and products 25.1 1.0 2.1 -1.1 1.3 15.4
22. Clothing and footwear 23.9 4.2 9.5 -5.3 1.2 0.4 
23. Cer~~ic products 21.7 o.s 1.3 -0.8 7.5 5.6 
24. Furnitures and fixtures 19.8 o.6 1.7 -1.1 1.2 1.1 
25. Transport equipment, except 19.8 0.7 1.9 -1.2 80.2 nil 
motor vehicles 
ALL }~l,'UFACTliRING 54.4 100 100 0 15.8 2.3 
Sources and Method: B.asic data obtained from DANE unpublished esti@'.ltes, as produced by IBRD unpublished documents. (See 
World B:.mk, Economic GrcY..-t:h of Cok~:1hia: Prd,;_e-ms and Pros:;ccts, Balti1l'l0re and London, The John Hopkins 
L-.iver.:Jity Pre°s:;, 1n2. PP• 49,a-:9I.:T-,c~;ti,c i!l3rket'1 WilS defined as dc:::estic production plus io:ports 
less \:'.,-i:po-x:ts. It reny b-~ noted th:1t the cl.:!f:ir,ition of manuf.::;.ctured experts excludes sliE:-itly processed 
fo.J,J!:~t:£::s~' su::-h a1- s~_:r;ar.. r~·..i.; Ii.\;;,,n rf::1art c:~itir:7.:ites !'Ii::·..nt.~f,:"~ctur~d e:tports" at $55.,6 :·!illion in 1967. 
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Nevcrthelc ss, from the first column in Table VIII-3 it may be assumed that 
activities like tobacco and food processing have requirements for human 
and physical capital per unit of output which exceeded the manufacturing 
average. 
On the whole, it is difficult to detect a powerful and unambiguous 
impact of post-1967 trade policies on the 1967-72 growth pattern of rural 
But besides the problem of untangling theand manufacturing activities. 
influence of new trade policies fror11 those of· other policies and varic1bles, 
the 1967-72 period is perhaps too short to allow for structural changes. 
During 1967-72, for example, the performance of individual manufacturing 
activities was in many cases more influenced by the long-run import-substitu
­
tion cycle than by the new export promotion policies, but such a situation, 
which can be noted in the rl~siduals of several of the trend regressions, 
could change in the future. 
Application of the technique used in Table VIII-1 and VIII-2 to the 
more aggregated national accounts indicates significant post-1967 acceleratio
n 
in growth rates only for primary production (in spite of deceleration in 
t:1inin3, mainly petroleum), construction and what Table I-2 called Type-II 
services. Construction and services, of course, have a very small degree of
 
"tradeability. 11 Thus viewed, the post-1967 acceleration in the growth rate 
of GDP could hardly be said to rest on a reallocation of resources, neither 
absolute nor relative, from non-tradeable goods and services toward tradeable 
ones. 
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Available data on 1967-73 changes in income distribution, employment 
and degree of foreign ownership and control are weaker than reviewed output 
indices. In spite of this limitation, the rest of the chapter will attempt 
to answer the question: what can we expect, viewing the matter during 1974, 
from further Colombian trade end exchange liberalization? This will in-
volve reviewing (and some guessing) as to what has actually beel.). happening 
to key variables during 1967-73. Guessing will also be necessary regarding 
the future trend of world prices for Colc;.nbian staples. If coffee, cotton, 
sugar, etc., were to keep their world prices reached during 1973, and so 
did all other tradeables, the case for further real effective peso devalua­
tions would become quite doubtful, and the ideal liberalization policy (as 
well as its urgency) would be! different from that which would result from 
expecting a 1956-57-style collapse of coffee (and other staples) prices. 
Evidence on the Stntic Effici2ncy Effects of Colo8bian Trade Policies: 
Review :md Outlod~ 
Colombian postwar trade and exchanie policies have induced static 
inefficiencies in the sense that some of the foreign exchange saved by iuport 
substitution could have been obtained cheaper, i.e., at lowe.r domestic re­
source costs, by w;ing in e.."-port activities Colo:nbia11. resources \-:hich have. 
low Oj)portuni ty costs, primarily natural resources of various kinds, and to 
a lesser extent, unskilled labor. This £orr,:iulation does not imply that 
resources unused by those export activities which "could have been," or 
which could have developed much earlier than they in fact did, found their 
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way to the import substituting sector. In the Colcmbian case it is more 
accurate to regard a good share of those low opportunity cost resources re­
maining untapped, as with natural resources, as blending into a murky non­
tradeable or "informal" sector. The blocking effect of trade and exchange 
policies in the "vent for surplus" process will be discussed in the next 
section, on the assumption that foreign non-preferential demand for many 
actual and potential non-traditional Colombian exports is high. Such a key 
assumption is also made in this section, which will focus on prima facie 
evidence of static inefficiencies. 
Earlier chapters have provided documentation for the assumption that 
during the postwar period Colombia could be said to have faced highly price­
elastic world demand for actual and potential non-traditional exports. Such 
a statement is of course easier to-make ex-post than ex-ante. The process 
of finding new foreign markets is much l!lore complex than implied by the 
small country assumption, and it is surrounded by considerable uncertainty 
both for individual export products, and for the whole export drive. Never­
theless, on balance it appears that excessive elasticity-pessimism dominated 
Colanbian policy, on the average, during the postwar. 
As a result, postwar public policy offered, on balance, greater encourage­
ment to import substitution than to exporting activities. Detailed studies 
on the exact incidence of such incentives are few, and available only for 
the more recent years. The most complete of them has been carried out by 
Thomas L. Hutcheson,
4 - who calculated, using various assumptions and methodo-
logies, effective rates of protection in 1969 for several manufacturing and 
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pr~r.ary activities. This valuable study relied on comparisons between 
Colombian and foreign prices for its calculations; his data crune predominant­
ly from Colombian producers comparing their domestic price with their export 
. 5price. 
Some of Hutcheson' s major results are presented in Table VIII-4; his 
calculations of effective rates of protection include an estTinate of the 
percent devaluation which would be required to maintain external balance if 
the protective structure were removed. Only one such estimate (34 percent 
devaluation) is presented in Table VIII-4. The theoretical and empirical 
difficulties in all of these calculations are well known; nevertheless, a 
major robust conclusion emerges from Hutcheson's results, showing the 
large variance in the prote.ction received by different sectors in 1969. The 
generalization that, on average, manufacturing is protected while primary 
production is not, c~1 be supplemented with the generalization that such a 
pattern fluctuates considerably from branc:h to branch. Indeed, if comparable 
data were available, they would almost certainly show that net protection 
also varies shnrply according to size of firm, or farm. 
Tariffs, import controls, export subsidies and exchange rates are only 
part of the state's arsenr.l of policy instruments~ Tax and credit incentives> 
or direct official participation, can be of 13rcater importance for some pro­
jects. Furthen:iore, the exact incidence of the whole array of policy instru­
ments can change from year to year, depending on such things as the actual 
and expected relative price structure being signaled to Colombia from world 
markets in a given year. Nevertheless, Hutcheson provides evidence indicatinr, 
that his .measures of effective protection are significantly and positively 
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Table VIII-4 
Effective Rates of Protection by Groups of Traded Sectors, 1969 
(percent) 
Balassa Method, with 
a 34 nercent exchange 
rate adjustment Corden Method 
Coffee -45 -45 
Hining - 8 - 6 
Sugar -23 -19 
1Primary, except coffee and mining 0 
Food products, except sugar 2 11 
Beverages 121 103 
95 84Tobacco
Textiles 5 8 
Shoes -22 -10 
Clothing 4 13 
Wood products -11 1 
l'uniiture -25 -11 
Paper- products 12 14 
Leather products 11 16 
Rubber products -31 -26 
Ch:zmical products 61 56 
Refinery products - 5 4 
Non-Metallic mineral products - 8 0 
Basic metals 151 39 
Metal manufacture 47 43 
- 7 12Non-Electrical machinery 
Electrical apparatus * 668 
TranHport equip.nent 610 319 
Diverse industries 117 89 
All roanuf ac turing 44 29 
All Llanufact u.ring, except 40 25 
tobacco and beverages 
33All nanufacturins, except sucar 50 
Primary exports, c..xcept coffee and mining 18 18
21Hc.nufactured exports, except sugar 21 
*Negative value added. 
Sources and r.1ethod: Adapted from Table 3.5, p. 68, in Thomas L. Hutcheson, 
"Incentives for Industrialization in Colombia," Ph.D. 
c:1ir.;scrtation, Department of Economics, University of 
Michigan, 1973. 
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related to growth rates of different branches in the manufa
cturing sector. 
He concludes that protection, particularly as measured by th
e Balassa 
method, made a difference in the pattern of growth within m
anufacturing. He 
argues that the structure of protection has contributed to s
low economic 
Proposing a policy of uniform protectiontgrowth and increasing uncmploycent. 
he expects that there would be much reshuffling within each 
sector as speciali­
zation occurred, but few cases of outright disappearance of 
sectors. 
Comparison of a few new export activities with some import-
substituting 
industries, as they stood around 1971, also yielded large ga
ps in the 
domestic resource costs between the two groups, of the order
 of two-to-one. 
While, for example, exporters of carnations and some leather
 products had 
domestic resource costs of 18 and 17 pesos per dollar obtain
ed, respectively, 
from prohibi­
a firm producing specinlized textile products and benefiting
 
tions against competition from imports had domestic r(;;source
 costs of 36 
pesos per dollar.
6 These examples have a useful pedagogical purpose, but 
more needs to be said nbout the prevalence of both extremes 
within the 
Colo:nbian sectors producing tradeable commodities. 
The extraordinary expansion of non-traditional exports durin
g 1967-74, 
although aided by favorable world econ0t:1ic conditions, has s
hown the large 
number of varied Colombian activities which (in all likeliho
od with few 
exceptions) have domestic resource costs no higher than abo
ut the exchange 
By 1973, minor exports had ceached between 5 and 6 percentrate plus the CAT. 
Given an annual growth rate in the dollar value of those expor
ts
of GNP. 
of about 15 percent, it is difficult to imagine scenarios fo
r which the 
minor export share in Gl{P could be much higher than that ac
hieved. 
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At the other extreme, the manufacturing activities found by Hutcheson 
to have the most offensive effective rates of protection, say 40 percent and 
above, account for about one third of value added in manufacturing (at 
domestic prices), or between 6 and 7 percent of GNP. A more precise identi­
fication of the "horror stories" of import substitution can be given. 
Prime candidates include: the autanobile industry, which received impetus 
during the late 1960s; petrochemicals and some chemicals, particularly 
phannaceu ticals; electrical appliances, such as refrigerators and washing 
machines; artificial fibers; and some alcoholic beverages (whiskey). Thus 
isolated, such sectors represent less than a third of manufacturing value 
added, and 'What becanes remarkable is how much of Colombian manufacturing 
operates around world prices. 
On the other hand, as emphasized by Francisco Thoumi, the share of man­
ufacturing investment captured during the last fifteen years by the "horror 
stories" is an i.,npressive one. It is estimated that between 1962 and 1967, 
gross investments in petroleum derivatives, including petrochemicals, 
amounted to pne fourth of all manufacturing investment.
7 David Morawitz 
reports that over 100 million dollars were invested in petrochemicals in 
Colcr.ibia in the 1960s, and another 120 million dollars in scheduled to be 
invested during the 1970s. 
8 Such projects have also taken up an important 
share of the limited pool of highly skilled professionals a..nd workers. One 
should note that sensible cost- ,:m<l cr.1ploy::1en.t-conscious criticisms of 
petrochemical investments have been made to look less than ~arsighted by 
the eccentric signals forthcoming from world narkets during 1973-74. Substantial 
direct aud indirect canmitments to the automobile industry have not yet found 
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a redeeming historical accident. 
9 It may be added that the participation 
asof direct foreign investment in many of the "horror stories," such 
automobiles, pharmaceuticals and artificial fibers, is large. The horror 
in those stories involves not just high real costs due to low production 
runs, unsuitable factor combination$ and other standard reasons, but also 
untaxed quasi-rents or excess profits earned by foreigners, and made possible 
by the protection system. Whether on its own or in partnership with foreign 
or local investors, the public Institute of Industrial Development (IFI, 
using its Spanish initials), has also involved its long-tenn credit facilities 
into several ill-starred import substitution schemes, including 
11Forjas de 
Colombia," making foundry products and rolling equipment and "COLCARRIL, 
11 
producing railraod wagons. IFI participated with Renault in the expansion 
of the automotive industry, and with public Venezuelan capital in the 
creation of a large plant for producing capro.:i.actmn, a sophisticated petro­
chemical (Honomcros Colombo-Venezolanos). 
The gradual lifting of import restrictions which has taken place since 
1967, and which appears to be accelerating during 1973-7 4 under the pressure 
of bulging foreign exchange reserves and extraordinary domestic inflation, 
has probably removed static inefficiencies involved in excessive precautio::iary. 
as well as speculntivc, holdings of inventories of importable goods. 
10 Such 
inventories usually involve spare parts, intermediate products and rau 
materials, but could also include installed but unused imported machinery 
and equipment. 
A strong a priori case can be and has been made linking LDC import 
licensing policies and generalized excess capacity in industry. But in 
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Colombia such a link appears weak. The major research done on the utiliza­
tion of fixed industrial capital in Colombia concludes,
11 first of all, that 
capacity utilization for recent years is relatively high compared with the 
few other countries for which there is infonnation. The hours of capacity 
use are related to long-run structural variables, including management 
quality 5, which are influenced by trade policy only indirectly. Stop-go 
cycles related to the foreign exchan~e bottleneck have influenced capacity 
utilization, particularly during 1956 throur,h 1967, and excess capacity in 
the "horror stories" of import substitution can also be found, but no strong 
general link appears to exist between import licensing as practiced in 
Colombia and excess capacity. 
While some ~jor ilnport substitution projects, whose efficiency was 
far from obvious, were lnunched after 1967 (as in the case of automobiles 
and some petrochemicals), the most recent yea:i::s have witnessed grm-:ing 
public sector reluctance to support similar schemes. Remember th,2t such 
reflected in the tariff and the management ofattitudes will not only be 
:import controls, but also, and often mainly, in the promises made or with­
held regarding credit, taxes and long term public support. This new ambiance 
in public developr.icn t offices, including IFI and othc:r public credit agencies, 
has perhaps been t10re important for what it has kept fror:i happening, tn.m 
for any tangible achievements. 
If extravag2.nt and massive new ventures into import substitution appear 
the decline, it r.amains true that the import control mechanism is stillon 
vigorously used for protecting existing (and some new) activities, beyond the 
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usually moderate tariff levels. Even with foreign exchange reserves reach­
ing $600 million during the first quarter of 1974, import controls remained 
more restrictive than during 1966 (pre-November). The biases described in 
Chapter VI remain, and under present and expected circtm1stances, it is diffi­
cult to make a good economic case for import controls as presently admin­
istered. Circumstances seem quite favorable for their retention only for 
special cases involving health hazards, threats to public safety, etc., for 
which tariffs may be insufficient. Elimination of most import controls 
should bring about modest gains in efficiency, and probably improve access 
to imports for medium and small businessmen, as well as those outside Bogota 
and Hedelli:n. An announcement of the decision to gradually eliminate them, 
accompanied by measures to be discussed below, should signal an even finner 
government commitment to expanding the export sector. 
The maintenance of some forms of exchange control, however, looks 
necessary, less for balance of payments reasons than to execute other Colonbi;m 
policies, such as vigilance over some kinds of capital inflows, particularly 
direct foreign investment. Standby exchan~e controls r.1ay not be a bad idea, 
anyway, for balance of payments rcasoris, in a country like Colombia, still 
wlnerable to unexpected changes in a far from stable world economy, and 
not so rich in policy tools that it can afford to throw away one still widely 
used in industrialized countries. 
By signing the Cartagena Agreement creating the Andean Common Market, 
Colombia ccxnmitted herself to a gradual loss of purely national control 
over her tariffs. A common external Andean tariff is to be agreed upon by 
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1975, and should be fully implemented by 1980.
12 The connnon minimum 
external tariff agreed upon in December 1970, and toward which Colombia is 
already moving, was not very different from the Colombian starting point, 
and could be described on the whole as lower and less varied than prior 
national tariffs. The hope has been expressed that the eventual conmon 
external tariff will be no higher, on average, than the minireura one, whose 
average is about 50 percent. The outlook is not clear, but Colombia has been 
reported to oppose higher duties. 
Ad hoc industrial complementation agreements among Andean countries, 
for which special protection would be granted, could nlso involve Colombia 
in transandean import substitution schemes, some of uhich could rationalize 
existing and mostly inefficient industries (e.g., steel), but not all of 
which could be desirable from an efficiency viewpoint. Progress has been 
slow in the negotiation of such agreements, which involve laborious and 
detailed parcelling out of plants among countries. It is also reported that 
Coloc.bia is on guard against the gestation, under these agreements, of white 
elephants of fmdean dimensions. 
It may be noted that the elimination of tariffs and controls over most 
intra-Andean con,--nodity flows, which should be completed for inflows into 
Cola~bia also by 1980, should generate non-trivial efficiency gains and 
exert a salutary competitive pressure on industry. Contrary to a widespread 
misconception, there is much room for trade creation within the Andean group 
(a point discussed in the papers listed in footnote 12). 
If import controls are eliminated over all trade, and purely Colonbian 
manaf;ement of import tariffs disappears, exchange rate policy will lama 
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even more important to keep possible balance of payments pressures from 
leading to inefficient trade policies. The point is reinforced by growing 
recognition of the advisability of revamping the system of export subsidies. 
As discussed in Chapter II, the CAT scheme has contributed to the expansion 
of minor exports, but as already noted it shows technical faults generating 
so:ne inefficiencies, and is becm.1ing increasinzly expensive in terr.is of fore-
gone badly needed tax revenues. Its gradual elimination, compensated by a 
faster upward crawl in the exchange rate, could leave exporters, on the 
average, no worse off than now, while providing more uniform incentives and 
13larger tax revenues. Elimination of import controls, discussed above, 
could help to offset the upward pressures on the domestic prices of import­
able goods which such measures would imply, although available information 
makes it difficult to be precise on this point, a further reason to handle 
the whole package in gradual steps (and once the inflationary pressures 
existing during the first half of 1974 are under control). It may be noted 
that the gradual elimination of both import contro_ls and export subsidies 
may reduce frictions and quarrels both with trade partners in the Andean 
14
region and elsewhere. 
Since the crawlinr peg sys·tem was adopted in 1967, most observers sym­
pathetic to ir.iport liberalization have felt that the crawl was too slow, 
citing as ultimate proof the continued need of licensing to repress :imports, 
and CAT to stimulate minor exports. High and risins foreign exchange 
reserves during 1973/74 suggest that the degree of peso overvaluation nay 
have been suhstantially reduced, nnd some may even question whether over-
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valuation exists. But 1973/74 show the complications of overvaluation cal-
culations: much hinges on what one assuraes about the future of coffee and 
other ccc.ciodity prices, as well as detailed elasticities in Colombian 
trade with different geographical areas. The latter is necessary, as the· 
peso followtld the U .s. dollar_ after August 1971, and devalued with respect 
to non-dollar key currencies. Sustained inflation in industrialized 
countries, of a type which may not be accurately reflected in price indices, 
add to the difficulties of putting much confidence on calculations such as 
those presented in Chapters 2 and 4. One has to fall back to observing the 
trend in foreign exchange reserves as import controls and CAT are gradually 
removed, to be sure as to the degree of present and future overvaluation. 
It also remains to be seen whether the crm-lling peg will be as successful 
under accelerating inflation as it was while Colombian inflation was re­
duced in the context of a relatively st.able world price level. 
Adoption of the policy p;.ckage described above would complete the 
trend started in 1967, cmd put Colombia fully into the Bhagwat~-Krueger 
Phase V. The impact of such a step on GNP growth, say over the ten years 
after it, is again difficult to quantify. Note th3.t now we are not takin~ 
as u base of comparison a situation characterized by rigid import controls 
and stop-go cyclcn, such as that characterizing most of 1956-67, together 
witu an out oo · o ·urtuer massive iuport The question is 
how much additional efficiency and growth would result from the suggested 
step. For reasons to be developed in the next section, it appears that the 
major gains to be reaped from post-1967 policies have been already captured, 
• ie 1 k f f t. • • · substitut1on.· · lS 
VIII-24 
nnd further gains nre unlikely to amow1t to m
ore than a fraction of one 
Indeed, given the conventions andpercent per year in the GNP growth rate. 
practice of national accountin'g, some of the
 gains may not even be reflected 
from review-ing
in GNP. Switching a civil servant with a Bi
ven salary 
license applications to rural teaching will 
not affect GNP, at lenst for a 
Psychic [pins and losses in dealing with, or
 wielding, bureau­
loni time. 
But even takinB into account possiblecratic power go unrecorded. And so on. 
unrecorded net gains, one should not expect 
the elimination of import controls 
or the style of the Colombianto revolutionize either the efficiency 
economic system. 
Trnck Policies, Forcd.rn Exchnnr:e Availabilit
v and Gro\1th 
Earlier chapters have emphasized how balance
 of payraents difficulties 
As shom,
hampered Colonbian !}rowth, particularly duri
ng 1956 through 1967. 
in machinery and equipment, and associatedin Table VIII-5, gross invcstmen t 
During the late 1950s
tcchnolop;ical change• still rely heavily on 
imports. 
the new steel mill in Paz del B.!.o put a dent
 in the imported share; the 
ic:lpact of the start of automotive production
 can also be detected in 1971-72. 
Throughout, less drru.iatic and probably more 
efficient metal-mechanic 
industries have also lwlped to expa.--id the sh
are of dcmestically procluccd 
machinery and equip;ncnt. 
After the coll.:tpBe of dollar coffee prices i
n the late 1950s, the 
constant-price share of GNP devoted to gross
 investment in machinery and 
equipment feil from an average of 12.6 perce
nt during 1950 through 1956, to 
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Table VIII-5 
Share of Im-oorts in Gross Inves t.r::icn t in Hachinerv _____,______________
e.ad Fqt:i-ct:;:2nt. :i.ncl...:.,!in'! 'l'r<',,i;nort: 








Sources ,m<l r.1ethod: National Accounts, BdlR. 
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7. 7 percent durini 195 7 through 1969. Only during 1970 through 1972 
has that: share risen in a sustained but tn1spcctacular manner to an average 
of 8. 3 percent of G:{P. While no detailed data are available on investment 
allocation, it is known that the 1950s witnessed considerable investment in 
social ov.:;rhead capital and other projects quite intensive in inported 
machinery and cquipr.,c.nt; examples include the already-mentioned steel mill 
and the Atlantic railroad. Thus, the drop in ~he GNP share devoted to gross 
investment in machinery and equipment reflects exo~enous changes in invest-
ment allocation as well as halo.nee of payments strinicncy. 
It may be seen in Table VIII-6 that investment in construction, while 
showing considerable year-to-year fluctuations smoothed in the table, behaved 
more stably than machinery and equipment capital formation; its direct and 
indirect import c0t:1ponen.t is much lower than that of the latter category. 
Note that all percentages presented in Table VIII-6 have been ccxnputed frcn 
data expressed at constant 1958 prices. It is instructive to ccmpare these 
numbers with those in Table VIII-7, showing CD.pital formation and its 
financing also as GNP shares. but with magnitudes originally in current 
prices. While Table VIII-6 shows 1950-56 investnent ratios exceeding those 
ca.iing later, Table VIII-7 shoHs the opposite. 
At an accounting level, the discrepancy is mostly explained by the 
evolution of the implicit prices of machinery and transport equipment, 
relative to the GNP deflator. As shown in Table VIII-8, a remarkable rise 
in the relative prices of those capital goods occurred after 1955-56; given 
Colombian dependence on imports of those goods, such a rise can be traced 
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Table VIII-6 
Gross Canital Formation. 1950-72 
(Percentages of G~P at markec prices; 
original magnitudes at constant 1958 prices
) 
Net ChangeBuildings, Nachinery andGross Capital in Invent.oric:,
F'o:-.r..'ation other Construction other 
Equipment 
and I~urovcments 
9.3 12.0 1.11950-54 22.3 
14.2 0.6
1955-56 25.7 10.9 
7.1 3.7
1957-58 20.8 10.0 
8.3 2.1
1959-62 20.2 9.8 
8.6 7.8 2.81963-66 19.2 




An in Table VIII-5.Source n,d n~e thod: 
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Table VIII-7 
Financing of Gross Cai;:,ital Formation, 1950-72 
(Percentages of G{,P at market prices; 
original magnitudes at current prices) 
Gross Capital Private Public Net Capital 
Formation Savings Sav:ings Inflow 
1950-54 16.1 11.9 4.1 
1955-56 18.2 12.0 4.5 1.7 
1957-58 19.6 15. 7 4.6 -0.7 
1959-62 19.9 14.9 3.8 1.2 
1963-66 18.8 12.6 3.4 2.8 
1967-70 20.9 12.0 6.1 2.8 
1971-72 22.1 12.4 5.1 4.6 
Sources and method: As in Table VIII-5. 
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Table VIII-8 
Imnlicit Price Deflators for Gross I:1",•3tc1ent, 1950-72··---~·-.._._____ -
(Divided over implicit price <leilator for G:.11 at 1:·,.:n-Ket prices; 1958=100) 
Buildings, Transport Hachinery Imported 
other Construction Equipment and other Machinery and 
and Imn rovc::1en ts Equipment Eauipment 
1950-54 97.9 54. 7 49.8 47.7 
1955-56 96.0 51.8 50.3 48.1 
84.21957-58 97.3 87.4 85.7 
1959-62 110.8 81.9 89.7 85.0 
1963-66 118.2 76.2 84.5 80.1 
1967-70 117.0 92.6 101.2 101.6 
106.01971-72 117 .o 99.8 99.l 
Sou re.es and method: As in Table VIII-5. 
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back to a similar increase_in the real ioport exchange rate, as can be 
seen ccc1paring the last colur:in of Table VIII-8 and Table IV-s. 16 After 
peaking in 1958, both relative prices fell~ until new devaluations and 
the crawling peg raised tlwr.1 back to around 1953 levels durin3 the late 1960s 
and early 1970s. 
The economic explanation for the sharp rise in the relative prices 
of machinery and equipment during 1957 and 1958, and their high levels 
thereafter, was the deterioration in the balance of payments first trigger­
ed by the collapse of dollar coffee prices. Such worsening of Colombian 
tenns of trade meant a loss in the effectiveness of the mechanism throur,h 
which the country transformed its savings into tangible raachinery and 
equipment. Coffeet at that time the indirect but oajor provider of non­
construction capital ~oo<ls, suffered nn exogenous drop in dollar prices, 
equivalent to a productivity less in rnisin/j the relative prices of rr. achi-
' 
ncry and equipment. A similar phenomenon has been recorded for another 
Latin American country, but for an earlier period.
17 
An increase in the 
real exchange rate for imports as well as for non-traditional exports may 
thus be viewed as a way to offset the decline in efficiency of the tradition­
al indirect way of obtaining machinery and equipment, by rationing available 
foreign exchanr:e r.10rc stringently, in the short run, and by encouraging 
new direct and indirect sources of machinery and equipment, in the long 
run. 
While the real evolution of capital formation is best measured at con­
stant prices, the burdens involved in achieving a given savings rate should 
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be measured at current prices, as in Table VIII-7. In an aggregate, ~­
post sense, it cnn be seen that the demand for all investment goods vas 
shown to be inelastic by the pos t-1956 increase in relative prices ;18 a 
larger share of GNP was saved domestically (except during 1963-66) after 
the rise in capital goods relative prices than during 1950-56. The 
paradm~ica.l increase in national savings at a time of severe balance of 
payments and growth crisis during 1957-58 is astonishing. It is noteworthy 
that national savings durine the prosperous years of 1971-72 stood at 17.5 
percent of GNP, substantially below the 20.3 percent rate achieved during 
the "blood, s,,eat and tears" years of 1957 and 1958. Contrasting all of 
1967 through 1972 with 1950 through 1956, the saving rates and capital 
inflow emcq;e as follows: 
1950-56 1967-72 
Private savings 12.0% 12.1% 
Public savings 4.2 5.8 
Net capital inflow 0.4 3.4 
Gross car._ital_Jormation 16.7% 21.3% 
Increases in the rates of public savinB and capital inflow account for 
about all of the increase in the current-prices rate of capital accumulation. 
Even allowing for possible changes i'Il the structure of investment 
allocation, it would be difficult to credit the 1967-72 acceleration in GNP 
growth on a higher rate of capital formation. Assuming a one-year average 
eestation period for. invcst~ents, and comparing constant-price rates of 
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gross capital formation with CUP growth rates, one obtains the following 
marginal capital-output ratios (MCORs): 
1951 through 1955: 4.08 
1956 through 1967: 4.81 
1968 through 1972: 3.22 
The sharp drop in HCORs between 1956-67 and 1968-72 contrasts with the 
more sluggish evolution of the aggregate investment rate, as follows: 
1950 through 1954: 22.3% 
1955 through 1966: 20.9 
1967 through 1971: 19.7 
One may speculate as to sources for the low MCOR during 1968-72. 
Earlier years had witnessed not only severe import restrictions on imports 
of capital goods, but also erratic stop-go fiscal and tionetary policies, with 
expansion~ry bin~es being followed by restrictive policies. Austerity 
in fiscal and monetary matters, when applied, did help the balance of payments, 
but at the cost of slowing GNP expansion, and generating excess capacity 
even in sectors whose direct and indirect demand for imported inputs was 
small. Excess capacity during 1956 through 1967 was due not so much to a 
lack of key faported inputs paralyzing whole factories, but to fiscal and 
monetary policies ,,Thich could not afford to be steadily expansionary for 
fear, a well-founded fez.r, of leading. to balance of payments problems. 
Selective measures allowing differential expansion depending on import­
intensity were difficult to irnpleracnt beyond gross aggregation levels. 
As the balance of payments situation improved after 1967 and support­
ed by the crawling peg, fiscal and monetary policy could avoid the violence 
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But by 1972-74, further encouraged by boomin8of previous stop-so spasms. 
world <le=iand, oacro policies may have become overly expansionary, i
n the 
sense that they could not be sustained. At any rate, since 1967 ex
cess 
capacity was steadily put to use, whether or not it relied on impo
rted 
inputs. Thus, new exports at one end tapped resources which had be
en less 
than fully used before, in a "vent-for-surplus" fashion, while expa
nsive 
aggregate domestic demand had a similar effect on all non-exporting
 activi-
1 • 19 h h a• T.T • \. h . . f ore1.gn. exc.1ange eai::nings, owever, sueties. ,~1.t11ou t t e r1.s1.ng 
scenario would not have been possible. In other words, given the e
xogenous 
dollar coffee price, the implicit 1956-67 "plan" was internally inc
onsistent, 
although containing static inefficiencies, such as a GNP growth rat
e of, say, 
six percent per annum requiring higher foreign exchange earnings, w
hich could 
not be replaced by import-substitution policies, given Colombian pa
rameters. 
The higher and steadier post-1967 growth oust have encouraged an 
investment process more efficient than that undertaken under the st
op-go 
gyrations of earlier years. How much this contributed to lowering 
the 
HCOR, however, is a moot point. 
It is likely that to sustain the GNP growth rates registered since 
1967, the constant-price investment coefficient, particularly that 
_in 
rnachinery and equipment, will have to continue, and at a faster rat
e, its 
upward climb. Tht: long run benefit of breaking the foreign exchang
e bottle­
neck, i~e. s allot;ing a larger inflow of i..-nportcd capital goods and 
a higher 
invest:I:lent rate, will then become oore visible than during 1967-72,
 when the 
short-run benefits dt!scribcd above predominated. Compared with ear
lier 
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years, Colombia now has a more diversified base for capital formation. Its 
indirect sources of machinery and equipment, e.g., exports, as well as 
its own direct output of those goods,look sturdier than in, say, 1956. 
Hopefully, an exogenous shock, such as the 1957-58 one, will not come 
around to test such sturdiness. It may be added that a more general diver­
sification in the Colombian productive structure, and thus a greater 
capacity to transform, makes policy tools potentially more effective in 
handling possible exogenous shocks, and in mai_ntaining both balance of 
payments and macroeconomic equilibrium. 
In discussing the links betwe.en trade policies and growth, this section 
has dealt e.xclusively with variations on the foreign-exchanne gap model, and 
with short-medium-term macroeconomic management, an approach which some 
may find overly "Keynesian." While emphasizing the importance of these 
effects for the Colombinn case, the author does not intend to deny the 
existence of possible links between trade policies and other dynamic effects 
influencing growth over the long run. But hard evidence on these matters 
20is scanty. Leonard Dudley, in a study of 25 import-substituting industries 
in the Colombian metal products sector during 1959-66, found important 
learning effects, explaining half of substantial productivity gains, 
particularly in casting, forsing and stamping. Whether or not import sub­
stituting activities generate larger learning effects than exporting ones, 
however, is a moot point. Colcmbia offers anecdotal evidence showing that 
some forms (e.c., in textiles) are remarkably X-efficicnt nnd innovative 
whether they devote ther.iselvcs to import-substitution or to exporting, as are 
VIII-35 
Germans with alternative socioeconomic systems.· It will be recalled 
froci Chapter VI that, as of 1971, major exporting firms still relied 
heavily on domestic sales. When the exporting experience becomes lon~er, 
and more differentiated from domestic sales, greater possibilities for 
exploring contrasts in behavior bet-ween exporting and import-substituting 
firms may become possible. 
Trade Policies~ Incone Distribution and Employment 
The use of one policy instrument, or a cluster of closely related ones, 
may bring a comnunity closer to achieving several policy targets simultan­
eously. Such happy circumstances, however, are rare. In the recent upsurge 
of export optimism in Colombia, as well as in other developing countries, 
there has been a tendency to suppose that switching from policies emphasizing 
import substitution to those giving greater incentives to exports will 
not only promote efficiency and growth, but will also significantly in.prove 
income distribution and accelerate the growth of employment in modem (or 
"truly productive") activities. This supposition is usually based not just 
on the observation that important controls mechanisms associated with 
import substitution benefit disproportionally the powerful .:ind rich, but 
also rests on appeals to a two-factor version of the Stolper-Samuelson 
theorem, featuring for developing countries plentiful labor and scarce capi­
tal, with or without downward wage rigidity. How much of an improvement in 
income distribution or employment one can expect from export-promoting 
policies, however, is usually not specified. 
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Earlier chapters have argued that Colombian :ir.:port controls and the 
protective system in general do appear to have biases strengthening income 
inequality, regional disparities and industrial concentration. The pro­
tective system has also encouraged a large number of capital-intensive 
projects. Nevertheless, it should be emphasized that elimination of import 
a multitude of similar mechanisms through whichcontrols would still leave 
the rich and powerful could take advantage of state power to buttress and further 
. . 21 
t heir. position. Imperfections.in domestic capital markets, to give one 
fashionable example, loom as large a source of inequality as import con­
trols. Thus, focusing just on the protective system can give a misleading 
impression of the true sources of inequality, confusing a sympton for the 
root of the disease. 
Earlier chapters have also presented evidence on the characteristics 
Such limited data suggest that, theof the new Colonbian minor exports. at 
very least, one would want to expand the usual two-by-two Hecksher-Ohlin 
trade model to a three-by-three one, to analyze the impact of trade policies 
on income distribution and employment. On the input side, land or natural 
resources must be ~dded to labor and capital, while non-tradeable goods 
(or the subsistence sector) must be added to importables and exportables. 
In the expa,,ded oodel, applications of the Stolper-Sanuelson theorem will 
bec01-:1e more difficult and acl-lwc. But more fundill-.-ientally, it was seen 
earlier that the emerEing trade pattern of Colombia cannot be explained only 
by a simple or expanded Heckscher-Ohlin oodel. Even leaving aside "unusual" 
trade flows probably induced by dor.iestic policies, such as Colombian trade 
VIII-37 
with other mer.1bers of the Latin American Free Trade Association (LAITA), 
other trade theories, such as vent-for-surplus, the product cycle, and those 
emphasizing loc;.ition, are helpful in explaining bits and pieces of 
Colombian foreir;n. trade. The implications of those positive trade theories 
for functional income distribution, much less for far.iily income distribution 
or for the income of the poorest half of the population, have not been ex­
plored systematically in the literature, either theoretically or empirically. 
If a given export-expansion can be explained with a vent-for-surplus 
model, the name of the distributional gaine will be pure rents. Who gets 
them depends on who owns the rent-yielding assets. If such assets are 
relatively homogeneous and compact in location, they can be grouped under 
one label, "land:" and a Heckscher-Ohlin model could be good enough to explore 
links between traclc and distribution, as in the Argentine case. In Colombia 5 
those assets· are less homor,ene.ous, ranging from sur,ar land in the Cauca 
Valley to mineral deposits scattered over the whole country. One crop or 
mineral I:lay be a heavy user of labor inputs, but others may not, depending 
on the technological characteristics of the production functions of the 
different staples, and the socioeconomic conditions in the region. Neverthe­
less, the 1972/73 boom in dollar prices of minor rural exports has high­
lighted one Arr:cntine-like. way of viewing a mechanism linkin8 greater 
openness of the ccono,ay with a worsening of income distribution: as those 
con­exportable goods bid up land prices, foodstuffs grown for domestic 
sunption, usinc somewhat similar land, also saw their prices rise, ahead 
of money wages in many cases. 
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For exports of manufactured products, the product cycle theory emphasizes 
whether a commodity is technologically new or old and standardized; whether 
it is labor- or capital-intensive is of secondary importance. The cement 
exported from the Colombian Atlantic coast, for example,is a standardized 
good, benefiting in that case also from location advantar,es; its capital­
intensity is not a major barrier in competing in the Caribbean area. Flat 
glass is also exported from Medellin, in spite of both capital-intensity 
and location· disadvantages. 
A switch, speaking in relative ten.is, from import substitution to 
export prcmotion could improve income distribution in countries such as 
Colombia, or could worsen it. And the change attributable to trade policies 
could be quantitatively important, or negligible. No simple model could give 
us answers to these alternatives, and the detailed information needed for 
confident projections is not available. Much of the same can be said regard­
ing the possible impact on employment, although there is reason. to be more 
optimistic here, at least for the urban sector. While the link between trade 
policies and income distribution has much to do with the structure of the 
import-competing~• that of the exporting sector, and relatively little with 
the overall growth rate, one may conjecture that the opposite is likely to 
be the. case for urban employ-J1ent. The impact of different growth rates on 
income distribution, ceteris narihus, is ambiguous, but is almost surely 
positive regarding urban employr.ient. Even if one fears that import liberaliza­
tion may destroy labor-intensive handicrafts, without compensating expansion 
in ;Labor-intensive exports, a higher GNP growth rate made possible by the 
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relaxation of the foreign exchange bottleneck is likely to have a net posi­
tive impact on urban employ:nent creation. Over the longer run, of course, 
this could feed buck positively on income distribution. The picture for 
rural e1:1.ployment is more complex, and much depends on what incentives are 
generated for changes in land tenure, and on the robustness of the sub­
sistence sector .. 
To clarify these uncertainties, one would like to have for marginal import­
competinr; and exportinr; activities direct and indirect input requirements of 
such thinr;s as.natural resources, unskilled and other labor, imported 
machinery and equipment, and other capital goods. Disaggregation of activi­
ties would clearly have to go beyond that in the available Colombian input­
output table, which has one row and column for the whole rural sector. Hope­
fully, one would then be able to compare, for example, the direct and indirect 
factor use of refined sugar with that of "refined cotton," i.e., textiles, 
which now are excessively dichoto.'nized as exports of primary products vs. 
exports of manufactures. 
But even at the level of first round or direct effects,additional 
information, not found even in quite disaggregated input-output tables, appears 
necessary to predict factor use. As noted earlier, factor proportions in 
a given Colombian industry differ markedly by firm size. It thus becomes 
important to knc\, whether large or small firms are carrying out marginal 
import-substitution or exporting. It is also relevant to investigate 
whether, as it se~ns likely on average, large firms have a larger participa­
tion in tradeable p,oods (both exportables and importables) than in the sector 
producing non-tradeable goods and services. Some i<lea of the variability 
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in factor use according to size of firm in the Colombian manufacturing 
sector is given in Table VIII-9, on the assumption that differences in 
average labor productivity reflect, at least partly, differences in factor 
use. This table indicates, for example, that the variation in the averaee 
productivity of firms employing between SO and 100 persons, across the standard 
industrial classifications, is not so different from the variation in average 
labor productivity of firms producin2 paper and paper products, 
but having different size. The table also suggests how little information 
one eains about factor use from knowing that a given firm produces tobacco or 
rubber products, without specifying size of firm. How much of this variabil­
ity is due to heterogenous output under the standard industrial classifica-
itms, and how much is due to differences in factor use in the production of 
Only finer"identical" goods is another moot point, given available. data. 
disaggregation according both to output and size can settle that issue. 
Similar considerations could be made regarding the rural sector, for which 
Albert Berry has c.locur,-.ented substantial differences in land productivity accord-
. f . 221.ng to arm size. Important distinctions in factor use exist especially 
between small subsistence farms, and large commercial ones. 
During a transition period between policies emphasizing import substitu­
tion and those promoting exports, as 1967-72 undoubtedly was, most exportinf, 
fims also sold substantially, and predo~inantly. to the domestic market. 
As late as 1973, a group of large firms accounting for 42 percent of register­
ed manufactured exports of that year, were reported to have sold 90.8 percent 
23
of their output in the doraestic market. As many of these firms have used 
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Table VIII-9 
Value Added Per Esrloyed Person in Col0t:1bian Manufacturinr-: 1 1967 
(a) 
Average (b) 
(Thousand Standard (b) Divided Number of 
1967 Pesos) Deviation bv (a) Cate~ories 
Accor-C.ir;~ to si.~c (')~ fjr.: 
1- 14 persons 29.1 18.4 0.63 25 
15- 19 persons 38.1 47.7 1.25 24 
20- 49 persons 42.1 34.6 o. 82 25 
50- 99 persons 47.0 28.1 0.60 25 
100-199 persons 64.6 48.5 0.75 25 
200 and over persons 81.3 79.3 0.98 24 
Tot2ls for each industrial 
classification 63.0 . 58.6 0.93 25-
Accordin1 to inoustrial 
classificaticn: 
Food 59.6 18.1 o. 30 6 
lleverDges 94.8 58.4 0.62 6 
Tobacco products 91.0 132.8 1.46 6 
Tc;:tilcs 32.5 8.6 0.26 6 
Clothini and footwear 22.9 6.1 0.27 6 
Printing and publishing 35.3 16.1 0.46 6 
Phnrm.:i.ceuticals & related products 68.9 33.1 0.48 '6 
Furnit,\r-e and fixtures 19.6 . 6.1 0.31 6 
Rubber products 75.6 88.7 1.17 6 
Cera.'::ic proJucts 17.5 6.2 0.35 6 
Non-electrical appliances 28. 9 10.0 0.35 5 
Electrical 2ppliauces 44.2 11.9 0.27 6 
Hotor vehicles 3 7.2 25.0 0.67 6 
Wood c1:1d proc.lucts 23.5 6.6 0.28 6 
Paper c1nd products 50.6 25.2 a.so 6 
Leather and products 34.2 15.7 0.46 6 
Chemicals otber than pharr..aceuticals 88.2 34.0 0.39 6 
Petroleum and coal products 158.7 98.7 0.62 5 
Non-met~llic oineral products 31.2 15.8 o.s1 6 
Basic metal products 77 .2 22.5 0.29 6 
Hetal products 33~ 7 13.4 0.40 6 
6Mechanical machinery 30.6 6.1 0.20 
Electrical r.1achincry, except appliances 43.6 20.6 0.47 6 
Transport equipment 30.3 8.1 0.27 6 
Other 40.8 11.6 0.28 6 
Total 1nanufacturing accordin~ to 
firn size 46.3 20.1 0.43 6 
Sources end r.:ct.ho<l: Basic data obtained from International Bank for Reconstruction .'.l.nd 
Ucvc.1opr,,~nt, ~i~.\:.'.'.-'.~::ic CrC'~~·th cJf Col_cd)i:·,: ?ct,bh•;·•::; and Pro•~nccts, Novemher 1, 1970, 
Voll.:."'le. IV, ,\:,pd,c i~~ 1, 'Lil.lie 11. lt [:i,c,11,i b~ nCJte:<l ti1at the averages shown for eaci, 
fin1 size c.:i.tc';>;cry or industrial cla!;sific:.tion caterory are the unweighted averages 
obtain.:cd trc.:1 the relcv ,mt s uiigroups, ,:hicb already involve some averagin;'.. Thus, they 
can be expected to differ fro;:i the (more exact) avera8CS shown in Table VlII-3. 
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underutilized capacity to produce exports, a given export expansion may have 
a widely varying first-round iopact on factor use depending on whether one 
deals with the short or the long run, and on assUillptions about firm behavior. 
Putting to use excess installed capacity for sales abroad could involve a 
marginal capital use per unit of output much lower in the short than in the 
long run. As the export drive becomes consolidated, and contrary to what 
is likely to happen in import substitution, new smaller finns may plun8e 
into exporting, once the larger firms have shown that Colombian output can 
compete internationally, and establish exporting infrastructure. Or 
smaller finns may become associated with larger exporting firms in increas­
ing m..nnbers as subcontractors (an evolution which has also occurred in the 
import competing sector). In short, the factor use observed during the ea::-ly 
stages for an export drive may be significantly different from that observed 
at more mature stages of export expansion, in a pattern different fron that 
observed during import substitution. 
The calculation of indirect effects on factor demands, and other general 
equilibrium effects, are also difficult to trace out with accuracy. The 
canplementary or indirect services required by different types of export 
and import substitutin~ activities could vary substantially. For example, 
the export of a staple like coal will need complementary capital-intensive 
services, such as transportation by r1'.l.ilroads or trucks to take the stuff 
to harbors, quite different from the needs of carnation exports, or those 
generated in duty-free zones. 
It was noted in Chapter I that Berry and Urrutia have shown that as of 
mid-1960s the distribution of Colombian personal income was highly unequal; 
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in their calculations for 1964, the Gini coefficient was 0.57. 
24 They 
find that a period of worsening distribution began in the 1930s and continu­
ed until around the r.1id-1950s, not only overall, but in both urban and 
rural sectors. From the mid-1950s until the mid-1960s, the evidence they 
examined suggests an improvement in urban distribution, a continued worsen­
ing of the distribution in agriculture, with a moderate overall improvement. 
They add that there is some tentative evidence that the latest episode of 
fast growth, between 1967 and 1973; may have been characterized by a deterio
­
ration in the position of the urban employed workers at least. Some of this 
effect may have been compensated by a decrease in unemployment, however. 
They conclude that the challenge now facins Colombia is how to avoid in the 
future an increase in inequality as econanic growth accelerates. 
Changes in the labor share in GDP provide a crude, but available, index 
of changes in income diGtribution. It may be seen in Table VIII-10 that 
1971-72, by which time the post-1967 policies had become well established, 
witnessed either an end or a reversal of the upward trend in the manufactur-
ing and overall wage shares which had started after 1955-58. The plunge 
in the rural wage share ouggests that new commercial crops use less labor tha
n 
the old staple, coffee, and than the subsistence sector. By 1972, the wage 
share was 26.5 percent in agriculture and livestock, 40.2 percent in manufac
tur­
ing and 39.4 percent for the whole GDP. 
Scattered evidence
25 suggests that op~n unemployment rates in the 
four largest Colombian cities peaked in 1967, and have been declining ever 





























Sources and method: National accounts of the BdlR. 
Commerce Transr,ort GDP 
18.3 36.4 35.9 
18.3 36.9 35.7 
18.6 44.0 37. 4 
18.3 47.8 39.3 
21.0 45. 3 40.4 
17.l 47.0 40.1 
Percentages were cooputed 
usinB data at current prices and measured at factor cost. 
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Colombia are typically young people, non-heads of families and others who 
can afford to be openly employed. Those at the bottom of the income scale 
usually have some kind of employment, and there is no evidence on whether 
demand for their services has expanded substantially since 196 7. 
Both a priori considerations and available post-1967 evidence cast 
doubt as to whether further import liberalization, by itself, will signifi­
cantly alter Colombian incor.1e distribution and enploynent patterns~ It is 
particularly doubtful that furthE..r import liberalization would do much for 
or against the bottom half of the income scale, say, during the next ten 
years or so. Indeed, it is conceivable that further encouragement of modem 
mechanized rural activities oriented toward foreign markets could further 
tla;uage the possibilities of landless farmers and minifundistas for obtain­
ing family-sized farms. It should be recalled that still about 45 percent 
of the Colombian active population is engaged in rural activities, and that 
a good share of the poorest part of the nation is to be found there. Unless 
other policies are adopted, the encouragement of commercial outward-oriented 
farming could worsen land and income distribution in the countryside, and 
by absorbing parts of the subsistence sector, it could actually generate 
disguised rural or urban unemployment. It would not be the first time in 
history that such a thing happens. 
Trade and Financial Policies, and the De~ree of National Autonomy 
While income distribution and employment data are scarce, at least the 
concepts involved are, in principle, quantifiable. "National autonomy" is 
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a vaguer concept, but of no lesser importance for those responsible for 
frmning international trade and financial policies in Colombia (and else­
where). As measured by the proportion of imports of goods and services in 
GDP, the openness of the Colombian econany rose from 13.0 percent during 1963-
2666, to 14.0 percent during 1967-70 and to 15.6 percent in 1971-72. Has 
this trend been accompanied by a significant change in the degree of control 
of Colombians over their own economy? What will be the impact of further 
liberalization and openness on such control? 
The post-1967 expansion of exports has been characterized not only by 
a remarkable diversification in the goods exported, but also by a continu­
ation of diversification of geographical trade partners, also noticed for 
imports. The extent of the geographical diversification may be seen in 
Tables III-8 and IV-10. It was also noted earlier, in Chapters II and VI, 
that the participation of foreign-owned enterprises in minor exports, while 
important, particularly for manufactured products, is less than that of 
domestic firms. It would indeed be dangerous for the political viability 
of export pronotion if the production or merchandising of new exports fell 
predominantly under the control of foreign enterprise. Dissatisfaction 
with protectionist policies was boosted as a greater share of finns in the 
cutting edge of import substitution turned out to be foreign owned. 
Vulnerability to external cycles and pressures has been reduced not 
only by geographical and product diversification• but also by the establish­
ment of preferential arrangements with countries at a similar stage of devel­
opment. The Andean common market may be viewed partly as insurance against 
a collapse of world markets; if such an event occurs, import substitution 
VIII-47 
at the Andean level could go into high gear to offset the collapse o
f export 
Had Latin America had such arrangements in 1929• the industrializa­drives. 
tion of the 1930s and 1940s would have been faster and more efficien
t. 
Trade is only one aspect of Colorabian links with the international 
economy, and trade liberalization will typically be accompanied with
 larger 
flows, in and out, of capital and special services, such as technol
ogy. 
A case can be made that international markets for technology and ca
pital are 
less diversified and competitive than those fo.r most goods, thus pos
ing a 
potential threat to the autonomy of countries relying too heavily on
 them 
without defensive mechanisms. Such mechanisms, of course, can also 
be used 
to obtain better bargains. For these reasons, it sec.ms wise for Co
lombia 
to retain present controls and registration procedures for transfer 
of 
technology and capital flows, particularly direct foreign investmen
ts, even 
as it moves to eliminate import controls. In some cases, the greate
r com­
petitive pressures put on import competing firms, many of them forei
gn owned, 
by the elimination of import controls, plus realistic exchange rates
, will 
reduce the importance of keeping detailed tabs on such matters as ov
erinvoicing 
of imported inputs and fake royalty payments abroad. This should al
low a 
greater efficiency of controls over transactions involving monopoly 
power 
originating abroad, rather than wasting effort dealing with monopoly
 power 
created by misguided domestic protectionism. 
Both capital and technological inflows raise the possibility that e
xcessive 
reliance on foreigners will weaken local efforts, and reduce the ca
pability 
of Colombia for long run autonomous development. 1be flabby perform
ance of 
recent Colorabian private and public savings, at a time of fast grow
th and 
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substantial capital inflow, documented earlier in this chapter, shows 
that such a preoccupation is not misplaced, even if it is difficult to say 
much oore on the subject, for a single country. 
More, however, can be said on different types of capital flows. Non­
concessional long term capital is now available to Colombia mainly in two 
forms: as direct foreign investment (DFI), and as sales abroad of Colombian 
debt. The former type, as is well known, comes as a package of technology, 
management, marketing and capital; often the last component is small, and 
the first a doubtful substantive contribution. The °'~e Decree-Law 444 of 
1967, which set up the framework.for a crawling peg and export promotion, 
established firm controls over DFI, later reflected in the celebrated 
Resolution 24 of the Andean group. The hysterics of the international 
financial press notwithstanding, DFI has continued flowing into Colombia. 
Indeed, and somewhat disappointingly, the allocation pattern of such invest­
ment since 1967 has not been very different from that before. It may be 
seen in Table VIII-11 that cheoicals, refineries, rubber and plastics, 
heavily oriented toward ir..port substitution, have continued attracting about 
one-third of DFI, The sane source given in that table indicates little 
change in the geographical source of DFI; the United States still accounts 
for about half, with the shares for Switzerland, France, Japan and the Feder­
27
al Republic of Gernany shot,:ini:; an increane after 196 7. 
As with other scmi-industrinlized and/or resource-rich developing countries, 
Colot'1hia has discovered durinp, the early 1970s that it could obtain sub­
stantial sums fr001 "arms-len13th" world capital markets. During 1973, for 
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Table VIII-11 
Accumulated D:ircct Forci~ Invcstf!lent in Colonbia 
(Percentages of total) 
Before Januarv. 1 , 
January 1, 196 7 through 
1967 December 31, 197Z 
Foodstuffs, bever.a.gcs and tobacco 6.8 3. 7 
Textiles, clothing and leather products 4.0 3.8 
Wood products and furniture 0.3 4.1 
Paper, printing and publishing 8.9 2.7 
Chemicals, refineries, rubber and plastics 31.8 33.3 
Non-metallic minerals 5.1 2.6 
Basic metals 1.6 1.2 
Hetallic products, machinery and equipment 11.3 12. 7 
Other manufacturing 0.6 0.4 
All manufacturing 70.3 64.4 
Fina11c;;c!~ insurance, real .estate and related services 11.4 24.4 
Co;n:ne.rcc, hotels Jnd restatn·.:1nts 11.4 6.5 
Mining (except petroleum) 2.7 1.4 
Transport and co~,nunications 2.4 o.8 
Agriculture, livestock and fishing 0.9 0.9 
All other 0.8 1.6 
Total 100.0 100.0 
Total value, million U.S. $ $429.1 $111.0 
Sources ,,,ad ncthod: BdlR, Infor::w ••• , 1972, page 122. Data re.fer to the registered 
and accu:-.J.'.llated value of investments, except those in petroleum. 
Registered value underestimates the value of assets owned and 
controlled by foreign investors. 
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example, Colombia was reported to have borrowed $170 million in the euro-
currency market. 
28 This source of funds, although expensive, provides a 
hea1t:1y alternative to both DFI and the more traditional forms of borrowing 
from multilateral intermediaries, such as the IBRD and the IADB, as well as 
to concessional bilateral finance•. Borrowing from the euro-currency market, 
as well as from other foreign capital markets, carries costs and risks not 
associated with borrowing from the IBRD and the IADB, but also involves 
less sacrifice of national control over investment decisions. As any fonn 
of foreign borrowing, of course, it bears careful control, both at the level 
of individual loans and as to aggregates. 
As measured by the traditional indicator, e.g., service payments on 
the whole e.xternal public debt as a percentage of exports of goods and non­
factor services, the Colombian debt burden rem~ins moderate. It stood at 
15.5 percent in 1965-66, at 12.8 percent in 1967-70, and at 13.8 percent in 
29
1971. So long as minor exports maintain their dynamism, the Colombian 
capacity to borrow in private markets looks quite good, potentially strenr,then­
ing the position of the country vis-A-vis multilateral intermediaries and 
bilateral donors (if any). 
On the whole, it is doubtful that the gradual post-1967 liberalization 
trenc.1 has substantially changed Colombia's capacity for autonomous decision­
making; on balance, the net change seer.1s to be, if anything, toward greater 
effective national control over the domestic econony. Aided also by trends 
in the world econor:1y, policy r.iakers are able to consider more options than 
they could realistically . face, say, around 1965. On the other hand, the 
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greater openness of the economy demands a more careful coordination of 
rate policies,different policy tools, such as monetary, fiscal and exchan3e 
than was necessary when both Colombia and the Atlantic world had less 
complex and interrelated econoraies, as during the 1950s. 
Some Final P.emarks 
The gradualist trade and payments policies followed since 1967 have 
impressive achievements to their credit. By placinB balance of payments 
manageoent on a routine basis, they have permitted a more efficient and 
faster overall growth rate, which appeared out of reach during 1957-66. 
A remarkable expansion of exports, aided by a booming world economy has 
confounded export pessifilists. The relaxation of the foreign exchange 
the frontbottleneck,'and the removal of periodic exchange crises from par,es, 
have given policy makers the option of turning their attention to the really 
serious problems in the Colombian economy, e.g., poverty, under.employment, 
areas in which the impact ofincorJe distribution and national autono:ny, 
trade and payments policies is indirect and weak, or even neiative. 
Further import liberalization, beyond the star,e reached in i;iid-1974, 
and a tidying-up of the export promotion system could, if properly managed, 
consolidate and slightly expand the post-196 7 gains in efficiency and growth. 
Other rcforr.i.s, however, are likely to have now a larger pay off, particularly 
re-in the area of incone distribution; those would include a profound tax 
fom, includin7, stiffer land taxes, expansion of public expenditures in 
education and health, and a liberalization of the dauestic capital r.1arket, 
either by giving a greater role to market-influenced interest rates or by 
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"as-if" lendine and borrowing policies of a nationalized banking and financial 
system. The relaxation of the foreign exchanie constraint has focused 
attention once again on the need to expand local,private and public savings 
if the overall growth rate is to be increased, or even maintained, as the 
marginal capital output ratio registered in recent years is unlikely to 
persist. A less distorted internal cap1tal market may help somewhat in 
this area. 
While avoidable balance of payments crises have not distracted policy 
makers in recent years, a similar "red herring" has re-emerged, especially 
during 1973 and 1974. It appears that during these years overly expansionary 
fiscal and monetary policies, including financial reforms boosting construction, 
led to an overheating of the economy which, coupled with exogenous increases 
in the world dollar price level, resulted in inflation rates not seen in 
Colombia for several years. Such inflation has, inter alia, endangered the 
crawling peg policy, undertaken since 1967 amidst declining inflationary 
rates. The policy maker, in particular the new reformist administration 
inaugurated August 1974, is forced to give first priority to a macroeconomic 
management problem without positive long run structural effects, but which 
if left unattended could have severe negative consequences. 
In retrospect, the Colombian experience vindicates the case for gradualism 
in import liberalization, which went pari passu with export expansion. It 
was not necessary to dismantle the protective system before that export 
expansion could be generated. The wisdom of avoiding shock treatments while 
keeping control over macroeconomic management policies remains relevant for 
anti-inflationary policies. 
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Footnotes to Chanter VIII 
1 These growth or decline rates refer to those obtained by fitting 
trend lines, as in Tables I-1 and 1-2. 
2Table I-2 shows GDP growth rates only for 1950 through 1956 and for 
1967 through 1972. Preliminary statistics indicate a GDP growth rate of 
7.0 percent for 1973. See Coyuntura Econcmicat Volume IV, No. 1, April 
1974, p. 5. UNECLA estimates place the GDP annual growth rate at 5.2 
percent during 1945-50, and at 4.2 percent for just 1947-50. The UNECLA 
estimates can be found in DANE-BMdEt No. 226, 1970. 
3see Ri~hard Caves, "Export-led Growth and the New Economic History," 
in J.N. Bhagwat:4~ al, editors, Trade. Bahmce of Payments and Growth, In 
Honor of Charles P. Kfodlcberr;er, Amsterdam, North-Holland, 1971, especially 
PP• 419-38.
4Thomas L. Hutcheson• "Incentives for Industrialization in Colombia," 
Ph.D. dissertation, Department of Economics, University of Michigan, 1973. 
5Thomas L. Hutcheson, .2.E.• ~, Appendix B, pp. 147-148. 
6These and other case studies are reported in Daniel Vargas and Eduardo 
Wiesner, "Las e.'>:portacionei:. y el empleo; Una perspectiva para Colombia, 
11 
FEDESARROLLO, Dogota, Nover.1ber 1971. There is little mystery in these 
domestic resource cost results: one typically start6 ~ith labor-intensive 
exports selling at world prices, and corapares them with heavily protected 
activities whose output sell domestically at prices twice or more those in 
world markets. The further contribution made to the gap in domestic resource 
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costs by cost structure differences and guesses about shadow input prices 
is quite small. 
7 see Francisco E. Thoumi, "Evolucion de la Industria Manufacturera 
Fabril 1958-1967," DA..~E-Bl1dE, No. 236, March 1971, P• 60. 
8
navid Morawitz, "Import Substitution, Employr.1ent and Foreign Exchange 
in Colombia: No Cheers for Petrochemicals, 11 mimeographed, September 1972. 
Morawitz adds: "In Colombia petrochenicals received more government 
finance and support than any other industrial sector in the 1960s. For 
example, in 1969 chemicals and petrochemicals participated 40 percent in the 
portfolio of the largest government industrial development agency (IFI) and 
received 25 perceut of all credits and refinancings granted by the govern­
ment's Private Im1estment Ftmd (FIP), in spite of the fact that it generated 
only 8 percent of industrial production and employment." (p. 1). 
9For an early analysis of this industry see Bernard E. Hunk, "The 
Colombian Automotive Industry: The Welfare Consequences of Import Substitu­
tion," mimeographed, August 1968. That paper was pessimistic regarding 
cost reductions in this industry even assuming Andean integration. 
lOSpeculative hoJ.din;:.~s of importable-f;oods inventories were emphasized 
by Alberto Roque ausalcm, but from a balance of payments. and macroeconoc1ic 
perspective. See his Dinc:ro 1 Inf.la_s:J-on y BcJla!,2-"c de Pa£;os: La Expericncia 
de Colo:nbia en l.1 Po:1t-(,u1lrr.:1, Banco de la Republica, Bogotii, 1971• 
particularly Chapter I. 
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11 see Francisco E. Thoumi, "The Utilization of Fixed Industrial Capital 
in Colo;nbia: Some [mpirical Findings," mimeographed, December 1973. 
12See my "The Andean Common Market: Gestation and Outlook," in 
R. s. Eck.aus and P. N. Rosenstein-Rodan, Editors, Analysis of Development 
ProbleD.s; Studies of the Chilean Economv, North-Holland/Anerican Elsevier, 
1973, pp. 293-326. See also David Horawitz, "Economic Integration Among 
Less Developed Countries with Special Reference to the Andean Group, 
11 
Ph.D. thesis, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, 1972. 
13Current tax revenues of the national government expressed as a 
percentage of GDP, which reached 9.8 percent in 1970, fell to approximately 
9.0 percent by 1973, contributinr; to an impressive fiscal deficit, and a 
deteriorating, inflationary situation durinr, 1973 and 1974. See Covuntura 
Econor.1ica, Valui;ie IV, No. 1, April 1974, p. 124 and pp. 133-134. 
141n a somewhat bizarre move, the U.S. Treasury during 1974 charged 
Colombia with "du.71ping" carnations in the U.S. market, giving as evidence 
the CAT received by those exporters. It will be recalled that the CAT 
has been in effect since 1967; its creation uas widely celebrated by U.S. 
AID officials. 
15Such a base was taken in my "The Andean Common Harket: Gestation 
and Outlook, 11 .9.£,• cit., p. 326. 
· dures may ovcremp . the 
between the real inport exchange rate and the relative prices of machinery 
and equipment by neglecting to fully account for changes in import premia 
16Nationa· 1 accounting proce hasize s0t:1ewhat 1in· k 
1 
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at times of balance of payments turbulence. Changes in import duties on 
capital goods, however, have been small. It will also be recalled that 
major industrial corporations import directly their machinery and equipment. 
17
See my Essays on the Economic History of the Argentine Republic, 
Yale University Press, New Haven, 1970, especially Essay 6. For a long 
time, Argentine national accounts expressed at constant prices used 1950 
as their base year. That year witnessed a peak in the Argentine relative 
prices of all investment goods, as 1958 did for Colombian ones. Researchers 
using Argentine and Colombian constant price data for cross-country com­
parisons have therefore frequently marve~d at the high investment co­
efficients and extraordinary marginal capital-output ratios of those 
countries. Contrary to the Argentine experience, Colombian implicit 
prices for the two Dejor commodity-producing sectors have evolved relative­
ly undramatically, relative to the GNP deflater, as follows (1958•100): 
Agriculture and 
Livestock Hanufacturins_ 
1950-54 99.0 109.3 
1955-56 104.3 103.5 
1957-58 102.7 101.0 
1959-62 96.2 103.6 
1963-66 96.9 106.0 
1967-70 94.3 97.6 
1971-72 95.5 97.2 
18 some model-builders have speculated rer;arding such an elasticity. 
See W.M. Corden, "Tr-.e Effects of Trade on the Rate of Growth," in 
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-- _________________;_,J.N. Bhaguati, et 111, editors, Trade, Balance of Pavments and Growth 
Honor of Charles P. r:indleben;er, North-Hollard Publishing Company, 
Amsterdam, 1971, Chapter 6, especially pp. 126-131. 
19rt is doubtful whether without the rise in minor and coffee exports 
Colanbia could have expanded its foreign debt and attracted other types 
of capital to the extent realized since 1967. 
20Leonard Dudley, "The Effects of Leaming on Employment and Productivity 
in the Colombian Hetal Products Sector," mimeographed, September 1973. 
21That statement, of course, stands whether the country is developed 
or underdeveloped. Without the presence of import controls (but with that 
of milk subsidies!), the 1973-74 Watergate matter in the United States 
showed the many channels through which private interests can manipulate 
state power. · The Hatessa scandal in Spain was in fact related to export-
promotion schemes. 
22
See R. Albert Berry, "Land Distribution, Income Distribution and 
Productivity," Chapter IV of a forthcoming book on the Colombian rural 
sector. 
23 see FEDESARROLLO, Encuesta Industrial, June 1974, PP• 7-8. In 
1972 these finns had sold 92.7 percent of their output domestically. 
24
R. Albert Berry and Hi~el Urrutia, Income Distribution in Colombia, 
mimeocraphed, Ch::1pter 12. 
25Here I follow (again!) unpublished estimates of R. Albert Berry, 
as well as FEDESATUWLLO, Covuntura Economica, several issues. 
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26
Both :ui1ports of goods and services and GDP (at market prices) are 
meas,ffed at Cllrrcnt prices. The perccntap:es will thus reflect changes in 
the re lat ion between the ,,verage import exchange rate and the GDP deflater. 





27A good share of the recistered DFI eives as its home base countries 
such as Panama, Curacao, Bahamas, Luxembourc and Liechtenstein, making, 
further precision as to geographical origins spurious. 
28 
see IHF Survcv~, June 3, 1974, p. 165. 
29 As reported in World Bank/IDA, Annual Report, 1973, pp. 88-89. The 
corresponding 1971 percentages were 21. 1 for Argentina, 17. 1 for Brazil 
and 24.7 for Hexico. 
